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Comments
CORPORATE STOCK AND THE LOUISIANA
GENERAL PROPERTY TAX
LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION OF 1921:
Article X, Section 4. The following property, and no other
shall be exempt from taxation .... (Italics supplied.)
X owns land worth $5,000.00. Y owns a stock of goods worth
$5,000.00. Z owns corporate stock worth $5,000.00. Both X and Y
pay state, parish, and municipal property taxes. Z, on the other
hand, pays no property taxes.' Does the constitution require that
Z be taxed? What weight should be given the fact that the cor-
poration owns or does not own taxable property located in the
state?
The language of the initial sentence of Section 4 of Article
X indicates that the legislature may create no tax exemptions-
that the constitution contains an exclusive list. This has long been
the general rule in Louisiana. The constitutions of 1864 and 1868
provided that:
"Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State.
All property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be
ascertained as directed by law. The general assembly shall
have power to exempt from taxation property actually used
for church, school, or charitable purposes. ' '2
This provision was held to prevent legislative exemption of
any property not of the types specified. After the adoption of
1. The writer is, of course, aware that not only the suppositious Z but
also most persons whose property consists of movables or intangibles escape
taxation. Such property is simply not listed in most cases unless connected
with an established business. This fact emphasizes the need for a thorough
reconsideration of our tax structure. See p. 117, infra.
2. La. Const. (1864) Art 124; La. Const. (1868) Art. 118.
3. In New Orleans v. Salamander, 25 La. Ann. 650 (1873) and New Or-
leans v. Louisiana Mutual Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 499 (1874), a statute impos-
ing a license tax and exempting defendant from payment of all other taxes
was interpreted to apply only to all other license taxes because "when a
law is susceptible of two constructions, we will adopt the one which will
give effect to the law, rather than the one which would render the law un-
constitutional." The same result was reached in New Orleans v. Lafayette
Ins. Co., 28 La. Ann. 756 (1876), on the ground that Article 118 "precludes
the exercise of the taxing power, except in the manner indicated." Accord:
New Orleans v. Bank of Lafayette, 27 La. Ann. 376 (1875); New Orleans v.
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the constitution of 1898, which provided that "The following
property shall be exempt from taxation, and no other,"4 it was
held that the legislature could create no tax exemptions. 5 The
same clause appeared in the 1913 constitution. The wording was
only slightly altered in the 1921 constitution; the rule that the
legislature could not create tax exemptions remained unchanged.7
People's Bank, 27 La. Ann. 646 (1875); New Orleans v. Metropolitan Loan,
Savings and Pledge Bank, 27 La. Ann. 648 (1875). See Morrison v. Larkin,
26 La. Ann. 699, 702 (1874); LeFranc v. New Orleans, 27 La. Ann. 188, 189
(1875); New Orleans v. The People's Ins. Co., 27 La. Ann. 519, 520 (1875).
In New Orleans v. St. Patrick's Hall Ass'n, 28 La. Ann. 512 (1876) it was
held that the legislature had no power to exempt property not actually used
for the purposes enumerated in the constitution. But in New Orleans v.
Fourchy, 30 La. Ann. 910 (1878), a municipal property tax, levied pursuant
to legislative authorization, was held constitutional although it exempted $500
worth of household furniture. The court stated that "the uniform practice
of the legislature in this State has been to exempt many classes of property
not embraced within the exception of 'church, school and charitable pur-
poses.' . . . [T]he question . . . is, of necessity, largely one of legislative
discretion. . . . We are not prepared to say that . . . the Legislature has
transcended its authority." 30 La. Ann. at 913. Two justices dissented from
this conclusion. In New Orleans v. Davidson and Hill, 30 La. Ann. 554 (1878),
the same decision was reached. In Louisiana Cotton Mfg. Co. v. New Orleans,
31 La. Ann. 440 (1879), the earlier cases were followed and a law exempting
a manufacturer from property taxes upon payment of a license tax was held
unconstitutional, one justice dissenting. The court attempted to distinguish
the exemption of property within a class from the classification of property
for taxation. It spoke of the Fourchy and Davidson cases as involving "an
exclusion . . . to be looked upon rather as being in the nature of limitations
of the general rule [that the power of the legislature to exempt property is
limited to the types of property named in the constitution] than as excep-
tions from it." 81 La. Ann. at 445.
"Be this, however, as it may, our opinion in the instant case is not
predicated on the postulate that all property must be taxed, but that when
property is taxed and comes within the general limit of the objects of
taxation the only power delegated to the General Assembly to exclude either
persons or classes from the general rule by it adopted is found in the con-
stitution. . . . [T]he power to define the objects of taxation would be one
thing, and that of exempting from the limits as defined and fixed another."
31 La. Ann. at 446.
Cf. Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. New Orleans, 24 La. Ann. 86 (1872),
Involving exemption from license taxation and distinguished on that basis,
despite its broad dicta, in New Orleans v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 28 La. Ann.
756, 758 (1876). And see Reynolds & Henry Constr. Co. v. Police Jury of
Ouachita Parish, 44 La. Ann. 863, 11 So. 236 (1892), holding an ordinance
remitting taxes in favor of a railroad, if the latter should comply with cer-
tain conditions, constitutional because it was "not properly a tax exemption,"
since the parish received consideration. Cf. New Orleans v. St. Charles-Street
R.R., 28 La. Ann. 497 (1876).
4. La. Const. (1898) Art. 230.
5. The statute incorporating defendant and exempting it from the pay-
ment of taxes on assets other than realty was held unconstitutional in New
Orleans v. Louisiana Savings Bank and Safe Deposit Co., 31 La. Ann. 826
(1879). Accord: State v. Louisiana Savings Bank and Safe Deposit Co., 32
La. Ann. 1136 (1880). Cf. State ex rel. DaPonte v. Board of Assessors, 35
La. Ann. 651 (1883), holding (two judges dissenting) that municipal bonds
were not taxable because such bonds were not "property" within the mean-
ing of the constitution as historically interpreted.
6. La. Const. (1913) Art. 230.
7. See Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 195 La. 43,
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The Louisiana rule is in accord with the almost unanimous
conclusion in other states having analogous constitutional pro-
visions. The legislature is held to be deprived of power to create
tax exemptions by a constitutional provision which declares that
mentioned types of property and no other shall be exempt,8 or
simply specifies the types of exempt property,9 or forbids the
passage of exemption laws, 10 or commands that all or certain
named classes of persons or property shall be taxed.1
The problems that arise in connection with the taxation of
corporate stock reflect the questions involved in the taxation of
intangibles generally. Stock is property, separate and distinct
from the property of the corporation which issues it. 12 It may be
196 So. 15 (1940), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court
for the 1939-1940 Term (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 267, 332, and discussed
infra at p. ...
"No principle of law is better settled in this State than that the Legis-
lature is powerless, directly or indirectly, to grant exemptions from taxation."
195 La. at 57, 196 So. at 19. See First Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Board of
Reviewers of Assessments, 41 La. Ann. 181, 188, 5 So. 408, 411 (1889); South-
land Investment Co. v. Jeter, 171 La. 106, 109, 129 So. 722, 723 (1930); First
Nat. Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 175 La. 119, 139, 143 So. 23, 29
(1932).
8. Little Rock & Ft. Smith Ry. v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97, 7 S.Ct. 469, 30
L.Ed. 588 (1887); Forshaw v. Layman, 104 C.C.A. 559, 182 Fed. 193 (1910);
Daly Bank and Trust Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 33 Mont. 101, 81 Pac.
950 (1905); State v. Carson City Savings Bank, 17 Nev. 146, 30 Pac. 703
(1882); Germania Savings Bank v. Town of Darlington, 50 S.C. 337, 27 S.E.
846 (1897); Cumberland University v. Golladay, 152 Tenn. 181, 274 S.W. 536
(1925); State ex rel. Richards v. Armstrong, 17 Utah 166, 53 Pac. 981 (1898);
Hollywood Cemetery Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 106, 96 S.E. 207 (1918);
Pacific Cold Storage Co. v. Pierce County, 85 Wash. 626, 149 Pac. 34 (1915).
See L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 111 Fla. 116, 120, 150
So. 248, 250 (1933).
9. Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 Ill. 578, 78 N.E. 895 (1906); People ex
rel. McCullough v. Deutsche Evangelisch Lutherische, etc., Confession, 249
Ill. 132, 94 N.E. 162 (1911). See also In re Assessment of Chickasha Cotton
Oil Co., 80 Okla. 101, 103, 194 Pac. 215, 216 (1921). Compare Wheeler v.
Weightman, 96 Kan. 50, 149 Pac. 977 (1915).
10. Files v. State ex rel. Pocahontas & H. R.R., 48 Ark. 529, 3 S.W. 817
(1887); Board of County Commissioners v. Owen, 7 Colo. 467, 4 Pac. 795
(1884); Campbell County v. Newport & Cincinnati Bridge Co., 112 Ky. 659,
66 S.W. 526 (1902); State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Gorden, 268 Mo. 713, 188
S.W. 160 (1916); Wenner v. Mothersead, 129 Okla. 273, 264 Pac. 816 (1928).
11. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Palmes, 109 U.S. 244, 3 S.Ct. 193, 27
L.Ed. 922 (1883); State v. Guaranty Savings Building & Loan Ass'n, 225
Ala. 481, 144 So. 104 (1932); Minturn v. Hays, 2 Cal. 590 (1852); Imperial Fire
Ins. Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 51 Colo. 436, 118 Pac. 970 (1911);
Atlanta National Building & Loan Ass'n v. Stewart, 109 Ga. 80, 35 S.E. 73
(1900); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Minister and Trustees of
Starr Methodist Church, 106 Md. 281, 67 Atl. 261 (1907); State v. Pioneer
Savings & Loan Co., 63 Minn. 80, 65 N.W. 138 (1895); State v. Insurance Co.
of North America, 71 Neb. 320, 99 N.W. 36 (1904); Pocomoke Guano Co. v.
Biddle, 158 N.C. 212, 73 S.E. 995 (1912); Ellis and Morton v. Linck and
Thomas, 3 Ohio St. 66 (1853).
12. See Van Allen v. The Assessors, 70 U.S. 573, 584, 18 L.Ed. 229, 234
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separately taxed without violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution or the equality and uniformity
clauses of state constitutions, even though the capital stock 13 or
property1 of the corporation is also taxed.
Yet, despite their agreement on the rules that stock is prop-
erty and that all property must be taxed, the majority of courts
have succeeded in reaching the conclusion that failure of the
legislature to tax the stockholders' interest or an express exemp-
tion of that property does not violate the state constitution. 5 The
reasoning of the California Supreme Court1 6 is typical:
(1866); New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U.S. 265, 277, 7 S.Ct. 198, 205, 30 L.Ed.
411, 415 (1886); and the cases cited in notes 13 and 14, infra.
13. See Board of Commerce v. Tennessee, for the use of Memphis, 161
U.S. 134, 146, 16 S.Ct. 456, 460, 40 L.Ed. 645, 649 (1896); Commonwealth v. Char-
lottesville Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Co., 90 Va. 790, 20 S.E. 364 (1894). Notes
(1903) 58 L.R.A. 513, 689; (1903) 60 id. 321, 367.
14. Cook v. City of Burlington, 59 Iowa 251, 13 N.W. 113 (1882); William
S. Wilkens Co. v. Baltimore, 103 Md. 293, 63 Atl. 562 (1906); Belo v. Com-
missioners of Forsyth County, 82 N.C. 415 (1880); In re First Nat. Bank of
Hillsboro, 25 N.D. 635, 146 N.W. 1064 (1898); Lee v. Sturges, 46 Ohio St. 153,
19 N.E. 560 (1889); South Nashville St. R.R. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, 11
S.W. 348 (1889). See Note (1906) 7 Ann. Cas. 1195.
The stock owned by a resident shareholder in a foreign corporation is
a fortiori taxable without regard to the taxation of the corporation in other
states. In re Greenleaf, 184 Ill. 226, 56 N.E. 295 (1900); Dwight v. Mayor, 94
Mass. 149 (1886); Dupuy v. Johns, 261 Pa. 40, 104 Atl. 565 (1918). See Note
(1910) 15 Ann. Cas. 895. And see Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730, 23 S.Ct. 401,
47 L.Ed. 669 (1903); Wright v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 195 U.S. 219, 25
S.Ct. 16, 49 L.Ed. 167 (1904).
15. Crocker v. Scott, 149 Cal. 575, 87 Pac. 102 (1906); City and County
of Denyer v. Hobbs' Estate, 58 Colo. 220, 144 Pac. 874 (1914); Georgia R.R.
& Banking Co. v. Wright, 125 Ga. 589, 54 S.E. 52 (1906); People's Loan &
Homestead Ass'n v. Keith, 153 Ill. 609, 39 N.E. 1072 (1895); Commonwealth v.
Walsh's Trustee, 133 Ky. 103, 117 S.W. 398 (1909); State ex rel. Wolfe v. Par-
menter, 50 Wash. 164, 96 Pac. 1047 (1908). Contra: State, to Use of City of
Memphis v. Memphis City Bank, 91 Tenn. 574, 19 S.W. 1045 (1892). See also
Wright v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 195 U.S. 219, 221, 25 S.Ct. 16, 17, 49
L.Ed. 167, 168 (1904); Deniston v. Terry, 141 Ind. 677, 681, 41 N.E. 143, 145
(1895); Kansas City v. Mercantile Mutual Building and Loan Ass'n, 145 Mo.
50, 46 S.W. 624 (1898).
Compare City of Moultrie v. Moultrie Banking Co., 177 Ga. 714, 171 S.E.
131 (1933), holding that the legislature could authorize the deduction of the
value of real estate taxed to a bank from the market value of the bank
shares in taxing such shares; In re St. Louis Loan & Investment Co., 194
Ill. 609, 62 N.E. 810 (1902), upholding the constitutionality of a statute author-
izing the deduction of the value of a building association's realty, taxed to
the association, from the value of the stock in assessing the stock for taxa-
tion. But see Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Palmes, 109 U.S. 244, 3 S.Ct. 193,
27 L.Ed. 922 (1883), holding unconstitutional a legislative exemption of rail-
road capital stock; People v. Eddy, 43 Ga. 331 (1872), denying the power of
the legislature to exempt a solvent debt; Consolidated Coal Co. of St. Louis
v. Miller, 236 Ill. 149, 86 N.E. 205 (1908), refusing to permit legislative ex-
emption of corporate capital stock; City of Chattanooga v. Nashville, Chat-
tanooga & St. Louis R.R., 75 Tenn. 561 (1881), holding unconstitutional an
act authorizing the deduction of the value of shares of corporate stock taxed
to the shareholders from the value of the corporate property in assessing
the latter for taxation.
16. People ex rel. Burke v. Bedlam, 57 Cal. 594 (1881).
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"[W]hat is the stock of a corporation but its property? . . .
When . . . all of the property of the corporation is assessed
... then all of the stock of the corporation is assessed, and the
mandate of the Constitution is complied with.... When the
property of the corporation is assessed to it, and the tax thereon
paid, who but the stockholders pay it? ... To assess all of the
corporate property ... and also to assess to each of the stock-
holders the number of shares held by him, would, it is mani-
fest, be assessing the same property twice .... [T]he Legisla-
ture . . . has not attempted to exempt any property from
taxation .... It has only said that the property shall be assessed
to the corporation, and shall not be again assessed. .... -17
The Louisiana Supreme Court, while insisting upon the full
taxation of other intangibles, not expressly exempted, has never-
theless refused to permit the assessment of stock in the absence
of a statute expressly taxing it. In Southland Investment Com-
pany v. Jeter8 the court spoke of any exemption of credits (in
this case, loans due the taxpayer) as unconstitutional.19 In First
17. 57 Cal. at 601-602. "The Constitution simply requires that all property
shall be taxed, but the method of doing it is left to the legislature. If the
method devised by the legislature reaches all property in fact, then there
is no violation of the constitution. . . . [T]he total wealth of the state can
be once taxed without the taxation of credits in any form. . . . The multi-
plicity of credits does not add to the wealth of the state." State ex rel. Wolfe
v. Parmenter, 50 Wash. 164, 173, 175, 96 Pac. 1047, 1048, 1049 (1908).
"'While it may be conceded that the interest of a corporation in the
corporate property and the interest of the shareholder in the corporation
are separate interests, yet in reality they both represent one thing,-the
money invested in the corporation by those who organized and created it'.
[ . . IT]axing the property of the association or corporation and taxing the
shares of capital stock in the hands of the stockholders would be double
taxation." In re St. Louis Loan & Investment Co., 194 Ill. 609, 614, 62 N.E.
810, 812, 813 (1902).
"[S]hares of stock. . . . are inconsequential property . . . merely tokens
or evidence of ownership of an interest in corporate property." Regulation
of the situs of stock by legislation is in no sense an exemption within the
meaning of the constitution. City and County of Denver v. Hobbs' Estate,
58 Colo. 220, 223, 144 Pac. 874, 875 (1914). "[Tlhe legislature . . . has pro-
vided, by general law, that the whole assessment should be made against
the corporation. In doing this the legislature did not intend to exempt any
property from taxation, and no property was exempted .... The legislature,
in order to avoid confusion and complication in the assessment, determined
. . . that the whole tax should be collected from the corporation itself."
People's Loan & Homestead Ass'n v. Keith, 153 Ill. 609, 621, 39 N.E. 1072,
1075 (1895).
18. 171 La. 106, 129 So. 722 (1930).
19. 171 La. at 109, 129 So. at 723-724: "[Ciredits are intangible property
of value. The Constitution does not exempt such property, but specifically
provides that all property of every kind and description in the state, shall
be assessed at its actual value, and, except such property as the Constitu-
tion exempts from taxation, shall be subject to taxation."
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National Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission20 taxation of securi-
ties at ten per cent of their market value was held violative of
the constitutional requirement that all property subject to tax-
ation be assessed at actual cash value. The decision in Hibernia
National Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission21 declared uncon-
stitutional, as a partial exemption, a statutory provision concern-
ing the taxation of shares of stock of banking corporations at the
corporate domicile; the act provided, in effect, that in establishing
the value of the stock only part of the corporation's net worth
was to be considered.2 2 But the court did not mention the section
of the statute28 which provided that the net worth of the corpora-
tion should not be taxed by direct assessment to the bank, but
only in the manner provided. Among the authorities quoted in
the Hibernia Bank case was a South Dakota decision 2 4 which held
unconstitutional a statute permitting deduction of debts from the
listing of credits for taxation; the constitutionality of a similar
provision had previously been upheld in Louisiana. 25
The first case considering the assessment of stock was State
ex rel. Mechanics' & Traders' Insurance Company v. Board of
Assessors26 in which Act 106 of 189021 was held to tax the stock
of a corporation whose property was constitutionally exempt
from taxation. But in Chassaniol v. Board of Assessors of the
Parish of Orleans2 8 it was held that corporate shares were not
taxed by the revenue laws then in force, although Section 1 of
Act 170 of 1898 was identical, in regard to the matter under con-
sideration, with the 1890 act. By chronological consideration of
the several previous tax acts, the court found manifested, despite
20. 175 La. 119, 143 So. 23 (1932).
21. 195 La. 43, 196 So. 15 (1940), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1939-1940 Term (1941) 3 LOUisiANA LAW RE ViEw 267,
332. The decision has just been followed in Flournoy v. First Nat. Bank of
Shreveport, 3 So. (2d) 244 (La. 1941).
22. A proposed constitutional amendment designed to avoid the effect
of this decision in regard to taxation of banking corporations, La. Act 389
of 1940, failed to receive ratification by the electorate.
23. La. Act 14 of 1917 [E.S.], as last amended by La. Act 172 of 1938.
24. In re Construction of Revenue Law, 2 S.D. 58, 48 N.W. 813 (1891).
25. New Orleans Securities Co. v. New Orleans, 173 La. 1097, 139 So. 635
(1932). See First Nat. Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 175 La. 119, 139,
143 So. 23, 29 (1932).
26. 47 La. Ann. 1498, 18 So. 462 (1895).
27. The act amended La. Act 85 of 1888. Section 1 provides: "[Tihere are
hereby levied annual taxes .... on . . . all property situated within the State
of Louisiana, except such as is expressly exempted from taxation by law,
and the term property as herein used means and includes. . . .all rights,
credits, bonds, and securities of all kinds."
28. 120 La. 777, 45 So. 604 (1908).
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the specific wording of the section, a legislative intention not to
tax both the corporate property and the shares of stock in the
hands of the shareholders. Without mentioning the Mechanics'
& Traders' Insurance Company case, the court said:
"It may be conceded, for the purposes of argument, that it
was the duty of the Legislature ... to enact laws taxing both
the capital stock and the shares of corporations. But the Legis-
lature has not done so, and the assessors have no jurisdiction
to supply the omission. 'Taxation is exclusively a legislative
power, and however clear the power, or even the duty, of the
Legislature to levy taxes on any particular species of prop-
erty, until that power has been extended [sic] the burden
cannot be imposed.' . . . If the shares ... [here involved] are
taxable, then the shares in every mercantile business and
transportation corporation in the state are also taxable. The re-
sult would be a doubling of taxation on all corporations. .... 2,29
This reasoning was approved and followed in Allgeyer v. Board
of Assessors8 0 And the same decision was reached in regard to
stock of foreign corporations in Ficklen v. New Orleans."'
Insofar as these cases interpret statutes whose words ap-
parently indicate a clear intention to tax stock owned by corpo-
rate shareholders to mean exactly the contrary, they are patently
vulnerable to criticism. In addition, so far as they support the
conclusion that the constitutional deprivation of legislative power
to create tax exemptions is effectual only in the case of an express
statutory exemption, they are open to criticism. If the constitu-
tion may be evaded and exemptions created simply by legislative
failure to tax, then it means little to say that the legislature may
not create tax exemptions; the words "and no other" might as
well have been omitted from Section 4 of Article X, for they are,
in fact, ineffectual as legislative limitations. 2 Even the double
taxation argument may be criticized as applied to the taxation
of the securities of corporations without assets in the state. In
29. 120 La. at 782, 45 So. at 606. See Forman v. Board of Assessors, 35
La. Ann. 825 (1883); State ex rel. Louisiana Improvement Co. v. Board of
Assessors, 111 La. 982, 1004, 36 So. 91, 99 (1902).
30. 121 La. 149, 46 So. 134 (1908). "There is nothing in the language of
the Constitution which requires double taxation on the same values." 121
La. at 151, 46 So. at 134.
31. 147 La. 567, 85 So. 330 (1920).
32. If such were the rule, any statute might evade the constitutional




such a case it is clear that there would not be double taxation. 8
If stock is property, and if the corporation itself has no property
within the state, failure to tax the stock results in a complete
escape from taxation by this jurisdiction. Legislative power to
exempt the stock of corporations 'owning property taxed by the
state is more easily justified.8 4 In such a case, it may be argued,
the legislature may look to substance instead of form and tax
only the property in which stock represents a mere ownership
equity.
That an attempt at the general exemption of intangibles
would fail is indicated by the cases dealing with intangible in-
terests other than stock and with the general question of tax
exemption .5 If this be so, then the question remains: Would a
statute expressly exempting stock be constitutional? An affirma-
tive answer might be justified on much the same basis as that
used in declaring that stock is not subject to taxation in the
absence of express statutory provisions. It is arguable that if
the legislature can exempt property by failing to mention it,
then it should also be able to create exemptions by express en-
actment, for the constitution makes no distinction between ex-
emption sub silentio and an express declaration to the same
effect. Failure to tax the stock of corporations with assets in the
state might be distinguished from exemption of the stock of those
without taxable assets in the jurisdiction, and a different result
reached if the statute applied only to the former.
This leads to the questions: Should all intangibles be taxed?
Should a distinction be made between stock and other intangi-
bles? In the absence of reliable factual information concerning
the value of property escaping taxation, untouched revenue po-
tentialities in the taxation of intangibles, and other operative
facts, it is obviously impossible to offer a sound suggestion as to
the policy which should be adopted in regard to taxation of
intangible interests. The subject plainly demands thorough re-
consideration, with regard to both facts and policy, from the
33. In a case already mentioned, Ficklen v. New Orleans, 147 La. 567, 85
So. 330 (1920), the stock of a foreign corporation owned by a Louisiana
resident was held not taxable.
34. In Klein v. Board of Tax Sup'rs of Jefferson County, 282 U.S. 19, 51
S.Ct. 15, 75 L.Ed. 140 (1930), a classification of stockholders for taxation on
the basis of percentage of corporate property taxable within the state was
held not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. Cf. the cases in note 25, supra, upholding statutes permitting deduction
of debts in the taxation of credits.
35. See pp. 110-111, and notes 3, 5, 7, supra.
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standpoints of tax justice, production of revenue, and tax admin-
istration. 6 Pending such a study, judgment concerning the best
manner of dealing with the matter should be reserved.7
ALVIN B. RUBIN
THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS
Although legal means have long been available to protect
the form in which many ideas are embodied, the ideas themselves
have remained unprotected almost until the present. Formerly,
however, there was scant need for protection. In addition, the
difficulties of administration of such protection made the courts
reluctant to assume the task.
During a period when the majority of ideas for business use
were those relating to mechanical improvements in the method
of production and usually were supplied by the master or his
servants for use in the business, patent' and trade secret2 law
36. In this connection see the arguments for the taxation of certain
intangible interests made in Welch, The Exemption of Intangibles from
Property Taxes, Tax Exemptions (1939) 155. And see Hughes, Tax Exemp-
tions (1935) 13 Tenn. L. Rev. 79, 87; Stimson, Exemption of Property from
Taxation in California (1932) 21 Calif. L. Rev. 193, 218.
37. Consideration of the problem elsewhere has led to various conclu-
sions. Some states have classified intangibles separately from other prop-
erty and tax them at a lower rate. See, for example, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933) § 64-901 et seq.; N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1939) § 7880(156),, et seq. It
has been suggested that they should be completely exempted, the loss of
revenue and injustice to the payers of property taxes to be offset by ade-
quate provisions in the general income tax law. See Twentieth Century
Fund, Committee on Taxation, Facing the Tax Problem (1937) 432; Michigan
Tax Study Commission, Report of the Tax Study Commission (1939) 37. Four
states have levied a special income tax, measured only by income from in-
tangibles. Ibid.
1. Rev. Stat. § 4886 (1874), as last amended by 53 Stat. 1212 (1939), 35
U.S.C.A. § 31 (1940) allows issuance of a patent for a new and useful ma-
chine, process, art or improvement thereof.
2. Former employees were enjoined from revealing trade secrets in Pea-
body v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 96 Am. Dec. 664 (1868); 0. & W. Thum Co. v.
Tlocznski, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N.W. 140, 38 L.R.A. 200 (1897); Stone v. Goss, 65
N.J. Eq. 756, 55 Atl. 736, 63 L.R.A. 344 (1903). See Vulcan Detinning Co. v.
Assman, 185 App. Div. 399, 173 N.Y. Supp. 334 (1918). Compare Silver Spring
Bleaching & Dyeing Co. v. Woolworth, 16 R.I. 729, 19 Atl. 528 (1890) where
a formerly employed inventor was compelled to reveal to his former em-
ployer a trade secret discovered while he was in plaintiff's service.
Use of a trade secret by one who knew of the employee's breach of con-
fidence will be enjoined. Westervelt v. National Paper & Supply Co., 154 Ind.
673, 57 N.E. 552 (1900); Aronson v. Orlov, 228 Mass. 1, 116 N.E. 951 (1917);
Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889); Eastman Co. v. Reichen-
bach, 65 Hun 620, 20 N.Y. Supp. 110 (1892); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v.
Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 At. 688 (1913). Accounting of profits from use of
